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Introduction 
In 1659, a London publisher printed a treatise entitled The Learned Maid, or, Whether a Maid 
may be a Scholar? A Logick Exercise, a translation of a Latin treatise originally written two 
decades earlier by a young woman from Utrecht, Anna Maria van Schurman (van Schurman 
1659). About fifteen years later, in 1673, an anonymous short vernacular treatise dedicated to 
Lady Mary, eldest daughter of the Duke of York, was published, also in London, entitled An 
Essay to Revive the Antient Education of Gentlewomen, in Religion, Manners, Arts & 
Tongues. With an Answer to the Objections Against this Way of Education, written by Bathsua 
Makin.  
Educational treatises such as these are important because, as Clabaugh notes, ‘the very 
essence of a culture is revealed in its educational attitudes, policies, and practices’ (Clabaugh 
2010, p. 164).  Whom a culture decides to educate as well as how this education is 
undertaken reflects not only pragmatic aspects about the culture but also something of the 
fundamental understanding the culture has of itself.  In this respect, educational treatises 
provide us with a very specific view about the self-conceptions of a particular time and place. 
These two treatises, van Schurman’s and Makin’s, are especially important because they are 
some of the earliest treatises arguing for the education of women that are both written by 
women and in English, and both authors were eminent scholars and educators themselves – 
as we’ll see in the next section.1 
In this chapter, I argue that more than the essence of a culture is illustrated in such 
educational treatises: Attitudes towards education also reveal the essence of that which is to 
be educated – at least, the essence as it is understood in a particular time and context (in the 
present case, the second half of the seventeenth-century) – and treatises on female pedagogy 
provide us with a special insight into how the nature of women is understood.  Both van 
Schurman’s and Makin’s treatises address the question of whether women should be educated 
by arguing that it is not contrary to the nature of woman to be educated. As a result, these 
treatises can be read as not only treatises in pedagogical theory concerning practical questions 
of education, but also as philosophical treatises in metaphysics.  
It might seem strange to investigate metaphysics through treatises on educational theory;  
but if we are interested in views on the metaphysics of women – and on women’s views of 
metaphysics – in the seventeenth-century, we can’t just open a seventeenth-century textbook 
on metaphysics. For no such textbook was written by women, and (as far as I am aware) no 
 
1  A good introduction to Makin and her educational theory is (Teague 1998); see also (Helm 1993).  
For van Schurman’s life and works, see (de Baar 2004, Larsen 2016, van Beek 2010).  On seventeenth-century 
educational theory in England, see (Greengrass, et al., 1994, Sadler 1966, Turnbull 1947).  The relationship 
between feminism and philosophies of education, tangential to the current arguments but providing further 
support for the importance of looking to educational treatises for understanding philosophical positions, is 
discussed in (Detlefsen 2017). 
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textbook written by men treats the topic of the essence of women as distinct from that of men. 
Thus, if we are interested in the metaphysical views of women in the seventeenth century, as 
well as seventeenth-century views on the metaphysics of women, we must look for these 
views elsewhere. Makin’s and van Schurman’s arguments for the education of women, while 
often ultimately pragmatic, are substantially grounded in metaphysical issues. By reading 
these treatises with an eye towards these issues, we can develop an understanding of how the 
metaphysics of women was viewed during the latter half of the seventeenth-century, 
particularly by women themselves. 
In this chapter I present van Schurman’s and Makin’s arguments for the education of 
women as a lens through which to understand their shared metaphysical conceptions about 
the nature, or essence, of women. The arguments that are advanced for the education of 
women provide us with an understanding of how the ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ of women was 
conceived of in this period, and which characteristics considered intrinsic to being a woman 
make women apt for education.  In the next section I sketch the biographies of van 
Schurman and Makin, and identify some of the characteristics and conclusions found in both 
their treatises. I then discuss the specifics of van Schurman’s and Makin’s metaphysics of 
women each in turn, showing how both women perceive women as having natures similar to 
men’s. I contrast the views of these two women with the view of a contemporary man on the 
same subject, Samuel Torshel, who in 1645 published The Womans Glorie. A Treatise, 
Asserting the Due Honour of that Sexe, and Directing Wherein that Honour Consists (Torshel 
1645).  Torshel’s treatise is a nearly 250 page argument in favor of many of the same 
conclusions as van Schurman and Makin, but it lacks the metaphysical foundations of the 
women’s treatises.  This allows me to use Torshel as a foil for my final metaphysical 
conclusions, that van Schurman and Makin both argue for explicit conclusions about the 
nature of women that are advocated only implicitly by male metaphysicians (such as 
Descartes and Locke) even half a century afterwards. 
 
Background and biographical information 
The identity of the author of the Essay was for much of the 20th century confused, due to the 
previous identification of her as her brother-in-law’s sister; it was not until 1993 that her 
proper biography was established. The author was born Bathsua Reginald (Rainolds) in 1600, 
the daughter of Henry Reginald (Reginolles, Reynolds) and sister of Ithamaria Reginald, who 
married John Pell in 1632 (Brink 1991, p. 314, Teague 1993, pp. 2, 5). In letters between 
Bathsua and John, Bathsua calls John her brother and calls herself his sister; later historians 
took this as literal rather than figurative and took her maiden name to be properly Bathsua 
Pell (Teague 1993, p. 2), and this created difficulty for establishing her biographical details. 
Bathsua in fact married Richard Makin, in 1621, and around 1640 entered court service as the 
tutor of Princess Elizabeth, daughter of Charles I. It was around this time that Makin and van 
Schurman corresponded (in Hebrew), and van Schurman’s treatise influenced Makin’s 
(Teague 1993, pp. 6–7). Makin may have been connected with van Schurman via her 
brother-in-law, who between 1643 and 1652 held chairs in mathematics in Amsterdam and 
Breda (Brink 1991, p. 319). Alternatively, van Schurman may have sought out Makin herself 
or been connected with her via Dorothy (Dorothea) Dury (née Moore)2 (de Baar, p. 122). A 
 
2  Moore herself was a proponent of women’s education, and is the author of a letter ‘On the Education 
of Girls’, intended for publication along with Adolphus Speed’s treatise on the same topic, but the publication of 
these texts was canceled due to lack of space (Webster 1970, p. 206, fn. 38). Moore’s treatise was reprinted in 
3 
letter from van Schurman to Makin can be dated to either 1640 (in which case van Schurman 
was already connected to Makin before Pell moved to the Netherlands) or 1646 (which would 
support a connection via Pell) (de Baar 2004, pp. 123–124).  In addition to her Essay, Makin 
also wrote poetry, including the Musa Virginea (Makin 1616), with verses in Greek, Latin, 
Hebrew, Spanish, German, French, and Italian, and as well as two poems to members of the 
Hastings family. 
Anna Maria van Schurman was seven years Makin’s junior. Born in Cologne in 1607, her 
family moved to Utrecht when she was a young child and she learned Greek, Latin, 
arithmetic, geography, astronomy, and music from her father. In 1636, she matriculated at 
Utrecht University, becoming the first female student at a Dutch university.3 Her treatise 
advocating the education of women was part of her correspondence with the Calvinist 
theologian André (Andrew) Rivet; it was published first in Latin, in 1638, 1641, and 1673, 
with translations into French in 1646 and English in 1659 (Ariew and Garber 1998, p. 1461, 
van Beek 2010, pp. 180–181).  In addition to advocating for women’s education, van 
Schurman also acquired renown as a painter and engraver, obtaining honorary admission to 
the St. Luke Guild of Painters in 1643 (van Beek 2010, p. 94), and wrote theological treatises 
(van Schurman 1639, 1648, 1673). 
At the time van Schurman and Makin were writing, there was no strong argument against 
teaching women how to read, so long as it did not take away from time better spent doing 
household chores. For a woman who can read is able to read the Bible, and a woman who 
reads the Bible improves her soul and maintains her virtue – her most precious asset.4 For 
both authors, the purpose of educating women is primarily practical. While education is not 
‘a thing requisite and precisely needfull to eternall salvation’ (van Schurman 1659 p. 6), for 
even uneducated women may still aspire to salvation5, any skills in language, education, wit, 
or mind are all still secondary to a woman’s piety and virtue. Fr. Spanhemius in his 
introduction to the 1659 English translation of van Schurman’s treatise says that ‘these Gifts 
are far inferiour to those which she accounteth chief; Piety without Ostension, Modesty 
beyond Example, and most Exemplary Holineses of Life and Conversation’ (van Schurman 
1659). Van Schurman further argues that if woman is to be virtuous, and virtuous action must 
conform to reason, knowing reason will make one more virtuous (van Schurman 1659, p. 22). 
She argues that ‘especially let regard be had unto those Arts which have the neerest alliance 
to Theology and the Moral Virtues, and are Principally subservient to them…especially 
Logick, fitly called The Key of all Sciences’ (van Schurman 1659, pp. 4–5). Other disciplines 
which are close enough to theology and moral virtues to shed light upon them include 
physics, history, and metaphysics.  
Many of Makin’s arguments for the education of women are similarly pragmatic. After 
pointing out that ‘Men, by liberal Education, are much better’d, as to intellectuals and morals’ 
(Makin 1673, p. 7), Makin notes that ‘greater Care ought to be taken of [women]; Because 
Evil seems to be begun here, as in Eve, and to be propagated by her Daughters’ (Makin 1673, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Turnbull 1947, pp. 120–121). Unlike Makin and van Schurman, Moore focuses on the practical aspects of 
women’s education, what and how and by whom they should be taught. She does not consider the theoretical 
foundations which justify offering such an education in the way that Main and van Schurman do. 
3  Some claim that she was the first female student at any university. This is a contentious claim, and the 
evidence for it is well discuss by van Beek (2010). 
4  See (Teague 1996) for more on the reading habits of early modern women. 
5  In this, van Schurman rejects the Lutheran view that ‘salvation of every human soul depended upon 
informed reading of the Holy Scriptures’ (Clabaugh 2010, p. 172). 
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p. 7). Women are both weak when it comes to resisting and strong when it comes to being 
tempted by evil (Makin 1673, p. 7), and thus given that education can promote virtue, it is 
important that women be educated, perhaps even more important than that men be educated. 
Makin argues directly against classical views, wherein ‘because females were widely 
regarded as potentially or even inherently vicious, irrational, and untrustworthy, it was 
commonly held that their education was not only unnecessary, but imprudent, 
counterproductive, even dangerous’ (Clabaugh 2010, pp. 166–167). In Makin’s view, 
‘Women ought to be Learned, that they may stop their ears against Seducers’ (Makin 1673, 
p. 25). 
In addition to the firm anchoring of their arguments in the salvific benefits of education, 
both women also point out the benefits to men of educated women; for an educated woman 
can produce educated sons, and assist her husband in his business cares.  But though most of 
their arguments are pragmatic, not all are. From a modern point of view, it is reassuring to 
read that both are happy to admit that the education of women can also be an intrinsic good, 
bringing pleasure to the woman so educated. 
Neither women ever makes explicit what she means by the ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ of 
women; in Makin’s case, this is not surprising, given that her treatise is not philosophical in 
nature and thus she does not need to go through the careful exercise of introducing, defining, 
and employing technical philosophical terms.  Van Schurman’s treatise, on the other hand, is 
explicitly couched in philosophical argumentative structures, and she does make a point of 
defining her primary terms (‘maid’, ‘scholar’, and ‘whether [a maid] may be’ (van Schurman 
1659, pp. 1–2)).  Though she does not explicitly define it, van Schurman uses ‘nature’ in two 
distinct ways.  In the first way, ‘nature’ picks out an active causal power that applies 
generally across creation, for instance when van Schurman argues that ‘Nature doth nothing 
in vain’ (van Schurman 1659, p. 8).  In the second way, ‘nature’ picks out the essence or 
‘true being’ of some ‘natural, finite phenomena’ (van Beek 2010, p. 67); for example when 
‘nothing is more agreeable to humane nature, then [sic] honest and ingenuous delight’ (van 
Schurman 1659, pp. 19–20).  Thus, I will not treat ‘essence’ and ‘nature’ as distinct notions, 
but rather use them interchangeably. 
 
The learned maid 
The central thesis of van Schurman’s treatise is ‘That a Maid may be a Scholar’ (van 
Schurman 1659, p. 1), and she begins with providing her definition of both:  
By a Maid or Woman, I understand her that is a Christian, and that not in 
Profession onely, but really and indeed (van Schurman 1659, p. 1). 
Despite this restriction of the subject to Christian women, van Schurman feels free to draw 
her examples of educated women from the pagans as well6, as does Makin. Additionally, 
though van Schurman includes all Christian women within the domain of ‘Maid’, through her 
examples and later discussion it is clear that she is happy to admit that not every maid is apt 
for education; her arguments are directed at those women who have the means and the time to 
devote to being educated. Women who must work to support themselves, or who have 
children to care for, may not be best suited for education:  
 
6  Van Schurman provides the reader with a list of sources in which one can read ‘of the eruditien of 
Maids’; these sources include Livy, Plutarch, and Pliny (van Schurman 1959, p. 3). 
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For some Maids are ingenious, others not so: some are rich, some poor: some 
engaged in Domestick cares, others at liberty (van Schurman 1659, p. 2). 
She defines a ‘scholar’ as follows:  
By a Scholar, I mean one that is given to the study of Letters, that is, the 
knowledge of Tongues and Histories, all kinds of Learning, both superior entitled 
Faculties; and inferiour, call’d Philosophy (van Schurman 1659, pp. 1–2). 
The study of scriptures is exempted, as it is taken for granted that this ‘without Controversie 
belongs to all Christians’ (van Schurman 1659, p. 2). The studies of a scholar are divided into 
two types: ‘universal, when we give our selves to all sorts of Learning or particular, when we 
learn some one Language or Science, or one distinct Faculty’ (van Schurman 1659, p. 2). 
The arguments that she gives for her conclusion are all syllogistic in nature, and can be 
divided into two types: Arguments based on characteristics of the subject (that is ‘Maid’) and 
those that are based on characteristics of the predicate (that is ‘Scholar’). In each case, van 
Schurman seeks to show how these characteristics make learning ‘convenient, that is, 
expedient, fit, decent’ (van Schurman 1659, p. 2) for women. 
My focus will be on arguments of the first type, from the characteristics of the subject, 
because they are the ones that will gives us insight into the nature of women. The arguments 
from the subject can be further subdivided into two types: Those that are intrinsic to the 
nature of women, stemming from some aspect of the essence of women, and those that are 
extrinsic, rooted in pragmatic and accidental properties of women. My further focus is 
arguments in the first category, because they provide insight into the underlying view of the 
metaphysics of women. 
First, though, I briefly look at some of the extrinsic arguments, to show how it is that they 
are extrinsic, and can therefore be ignored in the remainder of my discussion. An example of 
such an extrinsic argument is the following objection to van Schurman’s main thesis:  
The studies of Learning are not convenient for those that are destitute of means 
necessary to their studies. 
But Women are destitute of means, &c. 
Therefore (van Schurman 1659, p. 28). 
The fact that women are destitute of means is not essential to their nature as women, for not 
all women are indeed destitute of means. On the positive side, van Schurman offers the 
following extrinsic argument:  
They that have the happiness of a more quiet and free course of life, may with 
most convenience follow their studies. 
But Maids for the most part, have the happiness of a more quiet and free course of 
life: 
Therefore (van Schurman 1659, p. 11). 
This, too, is not essential to the nature or essence of women; it is happenstance (or, if you are 
more cynical, a direct result of the patriarchal social structures in place at the time) that 
women have more quiet leisure time than men do, simply because they are excluded from so 
many of the realms that would deprive them of this quiet leisure time. (Van Schurman makes 
precisely this point when she notes that women are ‘exempt from publick cares’ (van 
Schurman 1659, p. 11).) 
Van Schurman gives seven arguments from properties of the subject; of these, three derive 
from intrinsic properties. These intrinsic properties are:  
6 
1. That ‘Maids are naturally endued with the Principles, or powers of the principles, of all 
Arts and Sciences’ (van Schurman 1659, pp. 6–7).7  
2. That ‘a Maid hath naturally a desire of Arts and Sciences’ (van Schurman 1659, p. 8).  
3. That ‘God hath created women also with a sublime and erect countenance’ (van Schurman 
1659, p. 9).  
The second and third properties are worth highlighting, because they indicate a lack of a 
distinction between the nature, or essence, of men and the nature, or essence, of women. In 
particular, in support of the second claim, van Schurman appeals to Aristotle, who argues in 
his Metaphysics that ‘all Mankind have in them by Nature a desire of knowledge’ (van 
Schurman 1659, p. 8).  Women are taken by van Schurman to participate equally in 
‘mankind’; because women are just as human as men are, they by nature also desire 
education; and where we would not shrink from satisfying the desire of a man we should not 
shrink from satisfying this same desire in a woman. This lack of distinction is a theme that 
van Schurman (and, we’ll see, Makin) continually picks up on in her treatise. 
The arguments from the property of the predicate provide us with indirect evidence 
concerning the nature of women. In these arguments, the major premise picks up on a 
characteristic property of being a scholar, but the minor premise relates these properties to 
characteristics of women (either specifically, or as members of a larger genus, such as 
‘human’ or ‘animal’). From these, we can extract the following characteristics of the nature of 
women:  
1. That ‘all creatures tend unto their last and highest perfections as that which is most 
convenient for them’ (van Schurman 1659, p. 15).  
2. That ‘the Honour of the Female Sexe is most tender, and needeth nothing more than 
Prudence’ (van Schurman 1659, p. 18).  
3. That ‘a Woman is by Nature prone to the vice of pusillanimity’8 (van Schurman 1659, 
p. 19).  
 
After considering arguments in favor of the education of women, van Schurman turns to 
objections to her thesis that maids can be scholars. Of these five objections, it is noteworthy 
that only one of them derives from the nature of women. Unsurprisingly, the view of women 
held by those who think women should not be educated is not very flattering: Women should 
not be educated because they are ‘of weak wits’ (and this fact, ‘they think, needeth no Proofe’ 
(van Schurman 1659, pp. 25–26)). Van Schurman’s response to this argument is quite clever: 
Rather than rejecting the claim that women are of weak wits, she accepts that they are, but 
shows that this is also a part of the nature of men, and therefore any argument from this fact 
to the conclusion that women should not be educated also applies to men as well. She points 
out that ‘not alwayes heroical wits are precisely necessary to studies: for the number even of 
learned Men, we see, is made up in good part, of those that are of the middle sort’ (van 
Schurman 1659, p. 26). Who cares if women are weak-witted? Men are only middling 
themselves. Not only that, but she goes further to make women’s weakness of wit a point in 
favor of them being educated, ‘because studies do supply us with aids and helps for our 
weakness’ (van Schurman 1659, p. 27). (This is a point that Makin also makes below.)  All 
 
7  In these, and in other quotes, I regularly, and silently, expand the ‘&c.’ of van Schurman’s text. 
8  ‘Pusillanimity’ is the vice of timidity or cowardice, with the further implication of not living up to 
one’s full potential. 
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of the other objections that van Schurman considers are extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, to the 
nature of women. 
 
The educated gentlewoman 
While van Schurman’s treatise is structured in a tight syllogistic fashion, the argumentative 
structure of Makin’s text is harder to tease out.9 At first pass, her argument is nothing more 
than ostension  –  lists of historical women who have excelled in different areas of 
learning.10 Makin provides examples of women who are educated ‘in Arts and Tongues’ 
(Makin 1673, pp. 8–9), of which some women ‘have been eminent in them’ and ‘the equal to 
most Men’ (Makin 1673, pp. 9–11); are good linguists (Makin 1673, pp. 11–12)11; are good 
orators (Makin 1673, pp. 12–13); understand logic (Makin 1673, p. 13); are profound 
philosophers (Makin 1673, pp. 13–14); understand mathematics (Makin 1673, p. 15); excell 
in divinity (Makin 1673, pp. 15–16); and are good poets (Makin 1673, pp. 16–21). After these 
long lists, Makin demands an explanation for why ‘the Vertues, the Disciplines, the Nine 
Muses, the Devisers, and Patrons of all good Arts, the Three Graces’ have historically been 
represented as women, if not the fact that ‘Women were the Inventors of many of these Arts, 
and the promoters of them, and since have studyed them, and attained to an excellent in them’ 
(Makin 1673, p. 21). 
Having thus established that women have been educated, and have been instigators of the 
fields of education, Makin then explains the ways in which women ought to be educated. 
Like van Schurman, she is happy to distinguish rich women from poor women (and to further 
distinguish, in each of these categories, women ‘of good natural Parts’ and ‘of low Parts’ 
(Makin 1673, p. 22)), and focus her attention on the education of rich women of good parts. 
She also agrees with van Schurman that while education can improve a woman’s virtue, it is 
not ‘necessary to the…Salvation of Women, to be thus educated’ (Makin 1673, p. 22). 
Women may lack education (perhaps because they lack the means or the time) and yet still 
not be damned. 
But the order of the lists that she begins the treatise with is an argument in itself. After 
giving examples of women who have excelled in a particular forté, Makin, playing the part of 
the devil’s advocate, objects that this is no skill, but part of the nature of women.  For 
example,  after the list of women who have understood logic, Makin notes that ‘Some think I 
have hardly spoke to the Purpose yet; Logick disposes to wrangle, a thing Women are 
inclined to naturally’ (Makin 1673, p. 13).  After having considered women skilled in 
languages, linguistics, and oration, she considers the objection that women ‘may learn 
Tongues and speak freely, being naturally disposed to be talkative’ (Makin 1673, p. 13).  
Makin meets each ‘objection’ by showing that this display of what the objector says is mere 
‘nature’ is developed in a particular and noteworthy bent. Women are not merely prattlers  –  
they are logicians. They are not merely wranglers  –  they are philosophers, divines, etc. 
 
9  Teague argues that van Schurman’s treatise ‘provides the format that Makin’s essay uses’ (Teague 
1993, p. 7), but it is hard to see how this can be justified; there is no hint of syllogistic reasoning, which 
provides the bulk of the shape of van Schurman’s structure. Van Beek recognises that ‘the form of the Essay is 
clearly different’ from van Schurman’s treatise (van Beek 2010, p. 181). 
10  Though this is in itself of interest; as Waithe notes, this overview of the history of educated women 
makes Makin one of the first, if not the first, female historian of philosophy (Waithe 1989, p. 137); Brink also 
calls her ‘one of the first scholars to work in the field of women’s history’ (Brink 1991, p. 313). 
11  By which she means they know many languages. 
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And all of this derives from the nature of women. The very features of women that the 
objector attempts to appeal to to dismiss women from the status of educated are the same 
features that Makin implicitly argues support their claim to that status. 
We saw above some of Makin’s pragmatic arguments for the education of women. These 
arguments can also be read as indicating the nature of women. Many of Makin’s arguments 
are theological in nature, revolving around God’s intended role or purpose for women. She 
notes that ‘had God intended Women onely as a finer sort of Cattle, he would not have made 
them reasonable’ and that ‘God intended Woman as a help-meet to Man, in his constant 
conversation, and in the concerns of his Family and Estate’ (Makin 1673, p. 23). Not only 
this, but ‘We cannot be so stupid as to imagine, that God gives Ladies great Estates, merely 
that they may Eat, Drink, Sleep, and rise up to Play’ (Makin 1673, p. 26). Instead, they should 
use their leisure time in becoming educated, so that they don’t, ‘for want of this Education, 
have nothing to imploy themselves, but are forced to Cards, Dice, Playes, and frothy 
Romances’ (Makin 1673, p. 26) or ‘dressing and trimming themselves like 
Bartholomew-Babies’ (Makin 1673, p. 30). She is not explicit about whether the intended 
purpose of woman is part of the essence of woman, but it is not unreasonable to think that she 
would assent to this.  
Other arguments appeal to ‘Nature’ as an effective cause, rather than God: ‘Nature 
produces Women of such excellent Parts, that they do often equalize, some-times excel men, 
in what ever they attempt’ (Makin 1673, p. 23). 
Furthermore, Makin does make a specific claim about the nature of women with respect to 
education and learning, namely that it is not ‘necessary to esse, to the substance’ (Makin 
1673, p. 22) that a woman be educated. Presumably she would say the same is true of men; 
she – like van Schurman – often dissolves arguments against the education of women by 
turning them into arguments against the education of men. 
It is interesting that almost all of the objections to the education of women that Makin 
considers are, in the terms that I used to describe van Schurman’s arguments above, extrinsic. 
No one will want to marry educated women, and it is against custom to educate them (Makin 
1673, pp. 30–31). Solomon’s ‘good Housewife’ is not commended for her education (Makin 
1673, p. 30). The end goal of learning is the public sphere, in which women do not participate 
(Makin 1673, p. 33). Women ‘will not mind their Household affairs’, ‘have other things to 
do’, ‘do not desire Learning’, and ‘are of low Parts’, (Makin 1673, pp. 33–34). 
All of these objections, Makin dispenses with short shrift. (‘Neither do many boys’, she 
replies to the objection that women do not desire learning (Makin 1673, p. 33).) 
Only two objections stem from the (purported) nature of women, and one of these is one 
of the objections that Makin takes the longest in rebutting. This is the objection that ‘Women 
are of ill Natures, and will abuse their Education’ (Makin 1673, p. 32). Makin calls this ‘the 
killing objection’ (Makin 1673, p. 32)…if it were unanswerable. And, of course, it is 
answerable. Makin takes up three points that she sees falling under this objection: That (1) 
‘They will abuse Learning’; (2) ‘They are of ill Natures’, and (3) ‘They will be proud, and 
not obey their Husbands’ (Makin 1673, p. 32). The first and third subobjections are extrinsic 
ones, and to both Makin replies by noting that ‘so do men’ and ‘This same Argument may be 
turned upon Men; what-ever they answer for themselves, will defend Woman’ (Makin 1673, 
p. 32). In this, Makin holds that what makes men suited for the pursuit of knowledge applies 
equally to women.  I will discuss the Cartesian roots of such a view below. 
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Regarding the charge that women are ‘of ill nature’, Makin wholly rejects it (albeit 
without clear argument; but then again, hers is not an argumentative treatise in the way that 
van Schurman’s is). She calls it ‘an impudent calumny’,  
as if the whole Sex of Women…had that malice infused into their very Natures 
and Constitutions, that they are ordinarily made worse by that Education that 
makes Men generally better (Makin 1673, p. 32). 
To extract an argument from this, we could say that the burden of proof lies with the objector; 
they are the ones that must explain what the difference in nature between men and women is 
such that men are generally made better by education but women generally made worse. 
Failure to give such a difference leaves one in the default position that there is nothing in the 
nature of women that distinguishes them from men with respect to education. 
The other objection stemming from the nature of women is that they ‘are of softer 
Natures’ (Makin 1673, p. 34). This she counters as being no objection at all, for that which is 
soft is more impressionable, and that which is more impressionable is more apt to benefit 
from education. Furthermore, that which is weak can be strengthened by education, and thus 
those who are of softer natures have the most to benefit from learning. Far from being an 
objection, it is a positive point in favor of the education of women. 
 
Despite the overtly non-philosophical approach of Makin’s treatise, the philosophical 
implications of her views are clear.  Many of her arguments for the education of women are 
clearly rooted in the nature or essence of women themselves, and not external or pragmatic 
considerations (though, as with van Schurman, some of her arguments are rooted in those 
considerations).  The metaphysical foundations of Makin’s arguments become clearer when 
we look at another collection of arguments for similar conclusions that almost wholly lacks 
this foundation. 
 
The glory of women 
It was not only women that were advocating the education of women in this period; 
enlightened men also saw the utility of such an education.  In this section I look at the 
structure of Samuel Torshel’s The Womans Glorie (Torshel 1645), published between Makin’s 
treatise and van Schurman’s translation into English, and arguing for similar conclusions.  
Torshel’s book is of interest to us here for two reasons: First, to see if any difference between 
women’s arguments for women’s education and men’s arguments for women’s education tell 
us anything about different conceptions of the nature and essence of women. Second, because 
Torshel’s book contains a translation of ‘The letters touching this argument, between 
And[rew] Rivet & A. Maria à Schurman’ (Torshel 1645, p. 34)12: 
For the confirmation of the point in hand, and for the honour of that Maiden Pen, I 
will translate into our own tongue for the use of our English women, so much of 
that learned Letter as concernes this present argument, which that renowned 
 
12  ‘From the prologue to The Learned Maid it becomes clear that Van Schurman’s Dissertatio had 
previously been translated into English; for in it the following reference can be found: ‘This strange Maid, being 
now the second time drest up in her English habit’. Recent research has established that the first translation of 
the Dissertatio came into being in 1645 under the auspices of Bathsua Makin and was included in the work The 
Woman’s Glorie, a manifesto written by Samuel Torshel, a devout chaplain at the royal court’ (van Beek 2010, 
pp. 180–181). However, Torshel did not translate the actual treatise, but rather part of the correspondence 
surrounding the treatise. In the 1659 translation, only an excerpt of the letter that Torshel translates is included. 
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Virgin, Anne Marie Schurman of Utrecht wrote in Latine (Torshel 1645, 
pp. 34–35). 
The first point of difference between Torshel’s treatise and those of van Schurman and Makin 
is the length – what they have been able to eloquently argue in around 40 pages Torshel 
expends nearly 250 pages on. Torshel’s primary conclusions are (1) ‘That Women are capable 
of the highest improvement, and the greatest glory to which man may be advanced’ and (2) 
‘That their highest improvement is that of the Soul, and their greatest glory is Soul-glory’ 
(Torshel 1645, p. 2). His method of demonstrating these conclusions is closer to Makin’s than 
van Schurman’s; to provide support for (1) and (2), he says ‘I will principally build upon 
Scripture Grounds and Examples’ (Torshel 1645, p. 5). 
Scripture tells us that ‘woman as well as man was created after the Image of God,’ and a 
consequence of this is that ‘woman hath the same prerogative of creation with man’ (Torshel 
1645, pp. 5–6). Thus, given that man has been endowed with a ‘spirituall, rationall, free, 
willing, immortall Soul’ and that ‘in his mind [there is] a right knowledge of Gods nature, 
will, and workes’ (Torshel 1645, p. 6), the same holds of women; this is, in part, because ‘the 
Soul knowes no difference of Sexe (Torshel 1645, p. 11) (a very Cartesian sentiment 
(Detlefsen 2017, p. 196)). Thus, while all three authors appeal to the fact that women are 
created in the image of God in the same way that men are, Torshel’s arguments are 
substantially more theologically- and less philosophically-based. 
Having demonstrated the scriptural underpinning for his conclusion in Chapter I, in 
Chapter II Torshel – like Makin a few decades later – proves his point by ostension, by listing 
women who have achieved eminence in ‘Wisdome, Policie, Deliberation, Secresie, [and] 
Learning’ (Torshel 1645, p. 16). After his excursion in Chapter III on van Schurman’s letter to 
Rivet, in Chapter IV he returns to the ostensive matter, provided examples of women who 
have achieved eminence in ‘Constancie, Courage, Abilitie to govern, [and] Piety and 
Religion’ (Torshel 1645, p. 74). 
But while the book starts off with a promising goal, the remainder of the book is devoted 
to paeans of women’s virtue and platitudes of practical advice; no further arguments are 
given. The question of education is left almost wholly behind, reduced to ‘the old and 
familiar cry of censorship’ that women should ‘read no romances, no plays, and no pastorals’ 
(Waith 1949, p. 136). 
 
I would like now to situate the metaphysical views we have teased out of van Schurman 
and Makin in a broader philosophical context.  The only explicit philosophical authority that 
van Schurman appeals to is Aristotle’s adage that ‘all Mankind have in them by Nature a 
desire of knowledge’ (van Schurman 1659, p. 8).  But this appeal can only be successful if 
the Nature indicated here is a nature that both men and women share.  Aristotle himself 
would not necessarily have agreed with this, as he ‘denied underprivileged classes of 
humanity, that is, women and slaves, certain powers of deliberation’ (Ready 2002, p. 566).  
Contemporary historians of feminism have noted how this ‘common tendency either to deny 
women rationality or to acknowledge in them a form of it qualitatively different from men’s’ 
(Ready 2002, p. 566) has been used to justify the continual oppression of women, especially 
when it comes to denying them equal education.  In fact, ‘granting women the same form of 
rationality as men was a necessary first step in advancing the situation of women’ (Ready 
2002, p. 566). 
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Makin and van Schurman are explicitly granting this equality of rationality, that women 
and men share the same forms and capacities of reason.  Both van Schurman and Makin 
emphasise the equality of the natures of men and women with respect to 
mankind/humankind, following Descartes, who also argued that the Aristotelian property of 
desiring knowledge was an essential property of humankind not mankind (Larsen 2016, 
fn. 37).  Descartes’ dualism, with its unsexed souls embodied in sexedbodies, ‘provides an 
ontological basis for the radical egalitarianism of women’s and men’s natures as well as their 
modes of reasoning’ (Detlefsen 2017, p. 191) and provides a way to support the claim that 
‘women’s human essence is identical with—and thus equal to—that of men’ (Detlefson 2017, 
p. 196). 
What we see in van Schurman and Makin is the explicit articulation of a metaphysical 
position that is only implicit in male authors through the end of the seventeenth century and 
into the next: The view that men and women participate in the same nature when it comes to 
their capacities and desires for learning and education.  At the end of the seventeenth 
century, such a view was advocated by Locke in his An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, but only implicitly does he accept ‘men’s and women’s claims to the same 
faculties of reason and reflection’ (Ready 2002, p. 563). 13   Locke’s views on personal 
identity are often heralded as playing a ‘complex and seminal role in the evolution of 
Enlightenment feminism, influencing the way in which issues like female education and 
marriage were debated well into the British Romantic period’ (Ready 2002, p. 564)14; but 
what we see here is that these views are neither new nor unique to Locke.  Instead, they were 
already expressed and articulated half a century before him, and by women. 
 
Despite the different structures and argumentative approaches of van Schurman’s and 
Makin’s treatises, their metaphysical conclusions are strikingly parallel. (Since Makin was 
influenced by van Schurman, perhaps this is not surprising.) While the overall conclusion that 
women should be educated is predominantly motivated by pragmatic concerns, such as their 
salvation and their ability to be adequate helpmeets to their spouses and children, both 
women appeal to the nature of women to ground arguments. Women partake in the same 
metaphysical nature as men – they are created in the image of God in the same way; they 
‘desire to know’ in equal capacity; they, despite this need not be educated – and in arguing for 
these conclusions Makin and van Schurman explicitly advocate the equality of men and 
women implicit in Descartes and Locke.  But equality of nature does not entail that their 
natures are identical; both women are happy to admit that women’s natures are not entirely 
identical to men’s. Where women differ from men, for example in the strength of their nature 
or character, these differences are unsuitable as the loci of arguments against the education of 
women. 
 
13    ‘As set out in the chapter “Of Identity and Diversity,” the definition of a person appears strikingly 
gender-neutral. The generic definition of a person as “a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection 
and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places” (2.27.9:335) assumes that 
men and women share the same faculties of reason and reflection’ (Ready 2002, p. 565). 
14  ‘Locke made it possible to conceptualize the self in terms other than the body and the soul—concepts 
that had long been implicated in arguments in favour of women’s subordination’ (Ready 2002, p. 563).  A 
reconceptualisation of the self in terms of minds makes it possible to focus on the aspects that the natures of 
men and women share. 
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When we compare these to treatises with Torshel’s – a comparison worth doing because 
all three authors aim at the same conclusions – despite the similarity in approach between 
Makin and Torshel in their appeal to specific examples of learned women in different fields in 
history, what is striking is the lack of explicit metaphysical argumentation in Torshel’s book. 
Outside of his appeal to example, his primary authority is scriptural. While neither Makin nor 
van Schurman reject theological premises, both of them complement the theological premises 
with arguments of a more philosophical – and more secular – nature. This in itself provides a 
further, and final, interesting conclusion: That it is, perhaps, in the nature of women to appeal 
to that very nature in support of their conclusions concerning their own education. 
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